Fiat objects by Smith, Barry
 
 
15
Published in N. Guarino, L. Vieu and S. Pribbenow (eds.), Parts and Wholes: Conceptual Part-Whole Relations and Formal 
Mereology, 11th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Amsterdam, 8 August 1994, Amsterdam: European 
Coordinating Committee for Artificial Intelligence, 1994, 15–22 
           
 
 
Fiat Objects1 
 
Barry Smith 
 
 
fiat money (OED): inconvertible paper-money made 
legal tender by government decree 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Human cognitive acts are directed towards entities of a wide range of different types. 
What follows is a new proposal for bringing order into this typological clutter. A 
categorial scheme for the objects of human cognition should be (1) critical and realistic. 
Cognitive subjects are liable to error, even to systematic error of the sort that is 
manifested by believers in the Pantheon of Olympian gods. Thus not all putative object-
directed acts should be recognized as having objects of their own. Broadly, the objects 
towards which human cognition is directed should be parts of reality in a sense that is 
at least consistent with the truths of natural science. But such a scheme should also be 
(2) comprehensive: it should do justice to each sort of object on its own terms, and not 
attempt to eliminate objects of one sort in favour of objects of other, more favoured 
sorts. Linguistic and other forms of idealism, as well as Meinongian theories, which 
assign to each and every referring expression or intentional act an object tailored to fit, 
yield categorial schemes which fail to satisfy (1). Physicalistic and other forms of 
reductionism yield categorial schemes which fail to satisfy (2). What follows is a 
categorial scheme that is both critically realistic and comprehensive. Thus it enjoys 
some of the benefits of linguistic idealism and physicalism, without (or so it is hoped) 
the corresponding disadvantages of each. 
 
 
 
 
                     
1. I am grateful to Laure Vieu for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
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The starting point for our categorial scheme is the concept of extended entity. Two 
sorts of extended entity shall be initially distinguished: objects, which are extended in 
space; and processes, which are extended in time. Examples of objects are: you and I. 
Objects are possessed of divisible bulk: they can be divided, in reality or in thought, 
into spatial parts. Examples of processes are: your life and my current headache. Of 
course, you and I are in a sense extended not only in space but also in time. But we do 
not have temporal parts in the sense in which our respective lives and headaches have 
temporal parts.2  
The suggested categorial scheme now recognizes also the outer boundaries of such 
entities in space and in time. The outer boundary of you is (roughly speaking) the 
surface of your skin. (We shall return to this ‘roughly’ below.) The outer boundaries of 
processes can be divided into initial and terminal boundaries (for example the 
beginning and the ending of a race). 
All of which leads to a categorial scheme along the following lines: 
 
 
                            entities 
                  _____________|_________ 
                 |                       | 
                 |                       | 
              spatial                temporal 
         ________|______            _____|________   
        |               |          |              | 
        |               |          |              | 
    objects           outer       processes      outer 
  (spatially         spatial     (temporally    temporal 
   extended         boundaries    extended     boundaries  
   entities)       [the outer     entities)       | 
   [e.g. me]       surface of     [my life]       |  
                    my body]                      |               
                                             | 
                                            ______|_______ 
                                           |              |                
                                      beginnings      endings  
                                      [my birth]    [my death] 
 
 
                     
2. Objects and processes can each be conceived as being put together or assembled out of (respectively: 
spatial and temporal) proper parts. The same holds true of extended accidents of objects: for example 
a two- or three-dimensional expanse of colour. See the discussion of such cases in Smith 1992 (under 
the heading “accidentals”). 
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There are genuine two-dimensional inner boundaries within the interior of my body 
in virtue of the qualitative differentiation of my body into organs, cells, molecules, etc. 
There are also genuine one-dimensional inner boundaries discernible on the surface of 
my body in virtue of its wrinkles, as well as edge-lines around warts, eyes, mouth, 
surgery-scars, etc. 
It is clear, however, that we do sometimes speak of inner boundaries even in the 
absence of spatial discontinuities and of intrinsic qualitative differentiation. Examples 
are: the equator and Bill Clinton’s waist,3 and if punctate boundaries are allowed then 
also: the North Pole, the midpoint of the sun, the centre of mass of my body. Even in 
relation to the perfectly homogeneous sphere we can talk perfectly sensible of its left 
and right hemispheres, etc.  
Analogously, we can distinguish also two sorts of inner boundary of a process. 
Examples of genuine inner boundaries – corresponding to spatio-temporal discontinuity 
or to intrinsic qualitative differentiation – might be: the point in the flight of the 
projectile at which it reaches its maximum altitude and begins its descent to earth, the 
point in the process of cooling of the liquid at which it first begins to solidify. Examples 
of inner boundaries of the second sort might be: the boundary between the fourth and 
fifth minute of the race, John’s reaching the age of three. 
Let us call inner boundaries of the first sort genuine or bona fide inner boundaries, 
inner boundaries of the second sort fiat inner boundaries. The opposition between fiat 
and genuine boundaries is analogous to the opposition drawn by Frege in the 
Foundations of Arithmetic between the ‘objective’ and the ‘actual’ [wirklich].  
 
The axis of the earth is objective, so is the centre of mass of the solar system, but I 
should not call them actual in the way the earth itself is so. One often calls the equator 
an imaginary line [gedachte Linie]; but it would be wrong to call it a made-up line 
[erdachte Linie]; it did not come into being through thought, the product of a 
psychological process, but is only recognized or apprehended by thought. If to be 
recognized were to be created, then we should be able to say nothing positive about the 
equator in relation to any time earlier than this alleged creation. (Frege, Grundlagen, 
§26, translation amended) 
 
The distinction between genuine and fiat boundaries applies not solely to inner 
boundaries but also to entities which play some of the roles of outer boundaries, too. 
National borders, as well as county- and property-lines, provide examples of fiat outer 
boundaries in this sense, at least in those cases where, as in the case of Colorado, 
Wyoming or Utah, they lie skew to the physical joints of reality.  
But lo! Once fiat outer boundaries have been recognized, then it becomes clear that 
                     
3. We are to imagine Bill Clinton as a convex tube whose midriff is characterized by neither qualitative 
differentiation nor edges or folds.  
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the genuine–fiat opposition can be drawn in relation to objects also. Examples of 
genuine objects are you and me, the planet earth. Examples of fiat objects are all non-
naturally demarcated geographical entities, including Colorado, the United States, the 
Northern Hemisphere, etc., and also the North Sea, whose objectivity, as Frege writes, 
‘is not affected by the fact that it is a matter of our arbitrary choice which part of all the 
water on the earth’s surface we mark off and elect to call the "North Sea".’ (Frege, 
Grundlagen, §26) 
Broadly, it is the drawing of fiat outer boundaries in the spatial realm which yields 
fiat objects. I say broadly, since it seems that there are cases of objects which ought 
reasonably to be classified as fiat objects whose boundaries involve a mixture of bona 
fide and fiat elements. (Haiti and the Dominican Republic, or the Northern and Southern 
hemispheres, are examples which spring to mind.)  
Just as the drawing of fiat outer boundaries in the spatial realm yields fiat objects, 
so the drawing of fiat outer boundaries in the temporal realm yields fiat processes: the 
Renaissance, the Millennium, the Second World War, the Reagan Years, my childhood, 
etc. All of these are perfectly objective sub-totalities within the totality of all processes 
making up universal history, even though the spatial reach as well as the initial and 
terminal boundaries of, for example, the Second World War were, like the spatial 
boundaries of Indiana or Illinois, decided (to different degrees) by fiat. 
Our categorial scheme can accordingly be extended as follows: 
 
                           entities 
                                 | 
               __________________|______________  
              |                                 | 
           spatial                          temporal 
              |                                 | 
    __________|_____                     _______|______    
   |                |                   |              | 
   |                |                   |              | 
  objects           |              processes           | 
(spatially       spatial          (temporally       temporal 
 extended       boundaries         extended        boundaries  
 entities)     inner/outer         entities)       inner/outer 
   |                |                   |               | 
 __|_____        ___|____          _____|___       _____|___  
|        |      |        |        |         |     |         | 
|        |      |        |        |         |     |         | 
bfo     fo     bfsb     fsb      bfp       fp    bftb      ftb 
 
 
where bfo = bona fide object, fo = fiat object, bfsb = bona fide spatial boundary, etc. 
 
 
19
The examples of fiat objects mentioned above are all cases where proper parts are 
delineated or carved out (by fiat) within the interiors of larger bona fide objects. While 
we can assume that all genuine objects are connected, fiat objects may be scattered: 
they may be such as to circumclude constituent bona fide objects within a larger fiat 
whole. Polynesia is a geographical example of this sort; other examples might be: the 
Polish nobility, the constellation Orion, the species cat. Higher-order fiat objects of this 
sort may themselves be unified together into further fiat objects (say: the Union of 
Pacific Island Nations). The fiat boundaries to which higher-order fiat objects owe their 
existence are the mereological sums of the (fiat and bona fide) outer boundaries of their 
respective lower-order constituents. Set theory is a general theory of the structures 
which arise when objects are conceived as being united together in this way on 
successively higher levels but ad libitum. This theory is of course of considerable 
mathematical interest. It is however an open question whether there is any theoretical 
interest attached to such ad libitum unification from the perspective of ontology. For 
the concrete varieties of higher-order fiat objects which in fact confront us are subject 
always, in their construction, to quite subtle sorts of constraints.  
To set out the constraints on the drawing of fiat boundaries is a task that is by no 
means trivial. For the moment, however, it is more important to consider what might 
be the justification for awarding the categories of fiat boundaries and fiat objects so 
crucial an organizing role in our categorial scheme. Are the geographical and political 
examples upon which our remarks have been concentrated truly of central ontological 
importance? To see why this question must be answered in the positive, consider what 
happens when two political entities (nations, counties, or even parcels of land) lie 
adjacent to one another. The entities in question are then said to share a common 
boundary. This sharing of a common boundary is, I want to claim, a peculiarity of the 
fiat world: it has no analogue in the world of genuine reality. To see this, it may suffice 
to imagine that two bodies, say John and Mary, should similarly converge upon each 
other for a greater or lesser interval of time, for example in shaking hands or kissing. 
Physically speaking, as we know, a complicated story has to be told in such cases as to 
what happens in the area of apparent contact of the two bodies, a story in terms of sub-
atomic particles whose location and whose belongingness to either one or other of the 
two bodies are only statistically specifiable: as far as the bona fide outer boundaries of 
John and Mary are concerned, no genuine contact or coincidence of boundaries is 
possible at all. In comprehending the apparent contact between the two bodies as a kiss 
or shaking hands, however, our healthy common sense grasps the corresponding 
entities unproblematically as real relations and as cases of genuine contact. My 
suggestion, now, is that we have to do here with entities belonging precisely to the 
realm of fiat boundaries in the sense introduced above. Kisses and handshakes and 
other, similar entities are creatures of the fiat world. Indeed I wish to go further and 
argue that the denizens of what we might call common-sense reality are in every case 
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entities whose existence is tied to the existence of a system of fiat boundaries in the 
suggested sense,4 and from this point of view it is worth bearing in mind that even in 
the geographical realm there are objects (deserts, valleys, dunes, etc.) reasonably 
classified as fiat objects which are delineated not by sharp outer boundaries but rather 
by boundary-like regions which are to some degree indeterminate. 
The motor for the drawing of fiat boundaries in commonsensical reality is on the 
one hand human perception, which – as we know from our experience of Seurat 
paintings – has the function of articulating reality in terms of sharp boundaries even 
when such boundaries are not genuinely present in the autonomous physical world. Fiat 
boundaries come to be drawn also in virtue of the groupings and refinings of reality 
which are involved in our use and understanding of natural language. Such grouping 
and refining occurs in a two-fold process. On the one hand, linguistic entities are 
themselves fiat processes demarcated out of concrete sound-material that is in itself not 
cleanly separated into tidy linguistic units. On the other hand external reality, too, is in 
a certain sense tailored to fit our linguistically generated expectations. We apprehend 
the world as consisting of ships, shoes and sealing wax, of bombings, butterings and 
burnishings, and in each case fiat boundaries are at work in articulating the reality with 
which we have to deal. Thus if I say ‘John built mud-pies in the sand’, then the real 
correlate of the object of this sentence is a complex plurality (fiat object) whose 
constituent unitary parts are comprehended through the concept mud-pie. If I say ‘John 
embarrassed Mary’, then the real correlate of the verb of this sentence is a complex 
dynamic affair (a fiat process) which is comprehended through the concept embarrass.5 
The way in which natural language contributes to the generation of fiat boundaries 
may be illustrated in relation to the correlated linguistic phenomena of (1) the mass–
count opposition and (2) verbal aspect (Mourelatos 1981). As to (1), the hungry 
carnivore points towards the cattlefield and pronounces ‘there is cow over there’. How 
does his pronouncement differ, in its object, from ‘there are cows over there’? Not, 
certainly, in the underlying real bovine material. Rather in virtue of the different sorts 
of fiat boundary which are imposed upon this material in the two distinct cases. As to 
(2), verbal aspect has to do with the ‘internal temporal constituency’ of the events 
towards which our empirical judgments are directed. (Comry 1976). Consider that 
concrete factual material which is John kissing Mary on a given occasion. This consists, 
we might crudely suppose, of three objects: John, Mary and a certain complex of 
                     
4. The theory of fiat boundaries is thus a contribution to the formal theory of the common-sense world 
such as is set out in Hobbs and Moore 1985. The ideas here presented may thus be conceived as a 
further development of the formal theory set out in Smith 1993. 
5. There are also what we might call negative fiat objects, as in `John cut a way through the brush', 
`John dug a tunnel under the road', and so on. (See Casati and Varzi 1994.) The question can be raised 
whether all holes are to be counted as fiat objects in this sense, or whether there are any bona fide holes. 
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temporally extended processes. In the extended totality of this factual material, fiat 
boundaries can come to be drawn in a variety of different ways. Thus the given factual 
material can be comprehended, for example, as: ‘John is kissing Mary’, ‘John is 
repeatedly kissing Mary’, ‘Mary is constantly being kissed by John’, and so on. 
Are such differences (cow vs. a cow, kissing vs. repeatedly kissing) ‘objective’, to 
use Frege’s term? Are they discovered in reality? Or are they created, as linguistic 
idealists would have us believe, through the introduction into our language of 
corresponding terms or forms of speech? As the passages we quoted from Frege above 
make clear, the answer to this question is by no means simple, for fiat entities have 
characteristics which point in conflicting directions. The elucidation of these 
conflicting characteristics is a difficult task, whose resolution would come close to 
resolving the so-called idealism–realism problem, a problem which has dogged 
philosophers at least since Kant. From our present perspective it will suffice to repeat 
once more that the entities in question (fiat objects and fiat processes) are autonomous 
portions of autonomous extended reality and are ‘objective’ in this sense. The 
respective boundaries, however, are created by us; they are the products of our mental 
and linguistic activity, and of associated conventional norms and habits. 
The notion of fiat entity, when once clarified, might be exploited, finally, in 
resolving a long-standing dispute in philosophical discussions of the concept of truth. 
Truth has classically been understood in terms of a correspondence between a judgment 
or assertion on the one hand and a certain portion of reality on the other. A problem 
arises in virtue of the fact that reality does not come ready-parcelled into judgment-
shaped portions of the sort that are predisposed to stand in relations of correspondence 
of the given sort. The practitioners of logical semantics have thus tended to treat not of 
truth as such (truth to reality), but of truth in a model, where the model is a specially 
constructed set-theoretic reality-surrogate. The theory of fiat boundaries can help us to 
avoid the need for this resort to surrogates by allowing us to treat judgment itself as a 
sui generis variety of drawing fiat boundaries, boundaries which include other 
boundaries as parts in analogy with the set-theoretic examples (higher-order fiat 
objects) mentioned above. True judgments effect a drawing of boundaries which is 
successful (which does not conflict with reality – in a sense still to be clarified). The 
resultant boundaries themselves are drawn, as before, in the extended world of genuine 
objects and associated processes. The fiat entities they circumscribe are typically many-
sorted: they include both objects and processes (as sentences standardly include both 
nouns and verbs). Such entities are on the one hand autonomous: that region of reality 
through which the given boundary is drawn – for example the complex of objects and 
processes which are involved in John’s kissing Mary – exists in and of itself, regardless 
of our judging activity, and so do all its constituent sub-regions. The whole itself is 
however also in a certain sense dependent on our judgment. For in the absence of the 
judging activity through which the drawing of the fiat boundary is effected, an entity of 
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the given sort would in no way be demarcated from its surroundings. Judgment-shaped 
parcels of reality can in this way be said to exist in autonomous reality, and to make our 
judgments true, yet the recognition of such entities is still consistent with that healthy 
respect for Ockham’s razor which is the mark of all scrupulous ontology.  
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